Physical intervention in the use of stored ssh-keys

We are currently looking at options for improving the security of logins for our organisation and I found about Nitrokey through its mention in this article. Report picks holes in the Linux kernel release signing process • The Register

Is the comment about the lack of physical intervention in the use of ssh-keys stored in Nitrokey valid? Specifically I am referring to this quote "“Other devices can be configured to require the user to touch the device before the smart card operations occur. As a result, the Nitrokey is protected only by a passphrase while inserted into a workstation.”

Are there any plans to enable this functionality?

Is the comment about the lack of physical intervention in the use of ssh-keys stored in Nitrokey valid? Specifically I am referring to this quote "“Other devices can be configured to require the user to touch the device before the smart card operations occur. As a result, the Nitrokey is protected only by a passphrase while inserted into a workstation.”

This is correct. (But note that even with the passphrase, the key cannot be extracted from the Nitrokey device for offline usage by the attacker.)

Are there any plans to enable this functionality?

Yes, the Nitrokey 3 will have a touch button and requiring a button press for key usage is a feature we plan to support.

Excellent, thanks for the response.

I’ll preorder a 3 then :slight_smile:

Any idea on when it will available?

I’m glad I could help!

You’ll find the latest information in this blog post (see the Status Update, 6/11/2021 section).