I consider to use two (or more) HSM 2 for CA root/intermediate ECC keys. As I understood, I should initiate 1-st HSM2 with DKEK, generate ECC key, than backup it as wrapped object, and restore to 2-nd HSM2.
My concern is that in this scenerio I need only one export of wrapped key, by I MUST initiate 1st HSM (and 2-nd too!) in the way that anybody with Physical access can export wrapped key too. Of course in practice the BAD can export, but need key shares (pbe files/password) to restore ECC. But key shares / pbe files with password is week, one factor security (something you know) in opposite to HSM2 (strong, two factor security - something you know - PIN, and something you have: Nitrokey HSM2).
If I generate key shares / pbe files, I can be sure that this not leak, buceause we cannot totally trust our x86 mainboards, x86 CPUS, servers/workstation.
Is any way - now or will be in the future (next firmware upgrade, next, let’s say HSM 3 device), to DISABLE (till next initialization) DKEK on 1-st HSM 2 after backup and on 2-nd HSM after restrore?
Is any plane in the future to arrange DKEK backup/restore in a such way that there will be impossible to reconstruct backuped ECC/RSA key outside of HSM2? For instance as follows:
- each HSM2 has secret (AES), private, SECRET, non exportable key, lets name id S-KEY
- each backup is wrapped with key=DKEK XOR-ed with S-KEY